In the summer of 2019, a United States surveillance drone was shot down over the Strait of Hormuz. President Donald Trump authorised retaliatory strikes, then pulled back with ten minutes to spare, citing the projected death toll. That moment of hesitation was not lost on Tehran. It confirmed, for the Islamic Republic's strategists, a working theory: that the United States could be outlasted.
Six years on, that theory has been vindicated a second time, as Washington finds itself once again at the end of a diplomatic cycle with little to show for its pressure. The pattern is now familiar enough to have a shape. Iran absorbs sanctions, endures periods of maximum pressure, and waits for American political conditions to shift — whether through an election, a distracted Congress, or a president unwilling to pay the domestic cost of military escalation. The Islamic Republic does not need to win any single confrontation.
It needs only to avoid losing decisively, and time, it has calculated, is on its side. This second phase, however, carries risks that the first did not. Iran's nuclear programme is considerably more advanced than it was during the original JCPOA negotiations, and the regional landscape — from Gaza to the Red Sea — has been transformed by more than a year of grinding conflict. What makes Washington's position particularly uncomfortable is the narrowness of the options that remain.