On a Thursday morning in May, Donald Trump made the terms plain: the United States would only advance its proposed civilian nuclear cooperation agreement with Saudi Arabia if Riyadh first normalised diplomatic relations with Israel. That single condition may be enough to stop the deal entirely. Saudi Arabia's government has consistently said it will not recognise Israel unless Jerusalem takes credible steps toward Palestinian statehood — a prospect that the current Israeli coalition, which includes ministers openly hostile to a two-state solution, has shown no willingness to entertain. The triangle is locked.

The stakes extend well beyond diplomacy. Under the agreement as currently drafted, Saudi Arabia could, within several years, be permitted to enrich its own uranium domestically. Enrichment sits at the heart of nuclear proliferation concerns because the same process that produces reactor fuel can, if taken further, yield weapons-grade material. Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has stated publicly that if Iran acquires a nuclear bomb, Saudi Arabia would seek one too — a remark that has not been forgotten in Washington or Vienna.

The US Congress still has to vote on the deal, and opposition is already building among legislators who worry that approving it could trigger a nuclear arms race across the Middle East. The proposed arrangement has also unsettled the United Arab Emirates, which built its Barakah power station under a far more stringent 2009 agreement. That deal required the UAE to sign an additional protocol with the International Atomic Energy Agency, allowing thorough inspections of all facilities, and to renounce domestic uranium enrichment entirely. The Saudi proposal, by contrast, is bilateral only — the IAEA is not a party — and the enrichment question remains unresolved.