On the morning of 28 February 2026, more than 100 cargo vessels were navigating the Strait of Hormuz as they did on any ordinary day — carrying roughly a quarter of the world's seaborne oil through a waterway barely 33 kilometres wide at its narrowest point. By nightfall, the strait had effectively closed. US and Israeli forces had launched coordinated large-scale strikes on Iran, Ali Khamenei had been killed within hours of the first wave, and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps had begun attacking shipping and the assets of US allies across the Gulf. A chokepoint that had always been described as a theoretical risk had become a real one.

What followed was not a swift resolution but a grinding cycle of partial ceasefires, disputed agreements and renewed violence that has now persisted for six months. Each diplomatic opening — tracked across roughly 4,000 Truth Social posts, 7,700 IRGC Telegram messages and a continuous feed of official statements — briefly stabilised oil futures before fresh threats unwound the gains. Data compiled by LSEG shows that the price swings have been among the most violent recorded since the 2008 financial crisis, as traders priced in both supply disruption and the possibility of a negotiated corridor through the strait. The mechanism of disruption is straightforward, even if its duration was not.

Lloyd's List Intelligence data, which covers only traceable transits of cargo-carrying vessels above 10,000 deadweight tonnes, shows that traffic through Hormuz fell sharply and has never returned to pre-conflict levels. Refiners in South Korea, Japan and India — three of the world's largest importers of Gulf crude — have been forced to seek alternative supply from West Africa and the Americas at significant premium.